Compelled Confession: A Case against Admissibility by Thoreson, Gregory K.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 4 Article 8
1-1-1985
Compelled Confession: A Case against
Admissibility
Gregory K. Thoreson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory K. Thoreson, Compelled Confession: A Case against Admissibility, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800 (1985).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol60/iss4/8
The Compelled Confession: A Case Against Admissibility
Modern confession law arises out of the United States Supreme
Court's 1966 opinion in Miranda v. Arizona.' In Miranda, the Court
held that the fifth amendment requires police to inform a criminal
suspect, prior to interrogation, of his right to remain silent and his
right to an attorney.2 If the suspect invokes either of these rights,
the Court will presume that his interests have been adequately pro-
tected.3 When a suspect waives his rights and submits to an inter-
rogation without consent, however, confession law becomes
operative to determine whether subsequent statements are admissi-
ble as evidence. 4
If a suspect confesses after a waiver of his Miranda rights, 5 an
issue arises as to whether the confession was voluntary.6 Yet, in
attempting to determine the admissibility of a confession, courts
have been unable to articulate a voluntariness standard which is
both viable and efficient. To be "viable," a standard must prevent
the possibility that an innocent suspect will confess; to be "effi-
cient," a standard must not unduly burden the investigative func-
tions of the police. Attempting to accommodate these
countervailing concerns, courts have created a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" standard. 7
This note addresses whether courts should consider the "prac-
ticality" of police efficiency when faced with the possibility that an
innocent person might be coerced to confess. Part I explains the
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 444. See also Note, Police Trickery as an Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1170 (1979). The defendant "must be warned of his right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney." 384 U.S. at 444.
3 384 U.S. at 444-45. The Court stated that the prosecutor could not use the defend-
ant's exculpatory or inculpatory statements made in custodial interrogation unless proper
procedural safeguards were taken to ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination was
not violated. Id. at 444.
4 The waiver of Miranda rights is the most common instance in which the question of
voluntariness must be decided. But because Miranda rights are only triggered when a sus-
pect is in custody and being interrogated, it is possible for statements made outside this
scope to be challenged on voluntariness grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Traficant, 558
F. Supp. 993, 995 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
5 384 U.S. at 444. According to the Court, a defendant could validly waive any or all
of these rights as long as the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id.
The defendant, however, after waiving his rights, can re-invoke them if at any time during
the interrogation he indicates that he wishes to speak to an attorney. Id. at 444-45.
6 The voluntariness test has also been adopted by the courts for determining the valid-
ity of a waiver of Miranda rights. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972),
United States v. Nash, 414 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
7 See notes 25-43 infra and accompanying text.
policy objectives underlying confession law. In light of these objec-
tives, Part II discusses the "totality of the circumstances" admissi-
bility standard and critiques that standard's practical application.
Part III proposes a new standard based upon Bram v. United States."
Under this standard courts would not weigh the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Rather, because the prevention of improper confes-
sions is paramount to the concerns of police efficiency, the Bram
test renders invalid all confessions where any "improper influence"
has been exerted. Finally, part IV examines several psychologically
coercive interrogation techniques and their continued viability
under the Bram test. This note concludes that the Bram standard,
unlike the totality of the circumstances test, effectively protects in-
dividual rights in a method consistent with the United States
Constitution.
I. The Policy Objectives of a Standard for Voluntariness
Two policy concerns underlie confession law. First, confession
law should protect individual rights by preventing the possibility
that an innocent suspect may improperly confess. Second, confes-
sion law should strive to protect society's economic and safety inter-
ests by promoting crime control. 9
The first policy objective-avoiding a mistaken confession-is
based upon two constitutional provisions: (1) the individual's privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination, and (2) the individual's
right to due process of law. The privilege against compelled self-
incrimination arises from the belief that using a compelled state-
ment against its maker offends the person's inherent dignity.' 0 Lit-
erally, this fifth amendment privilege protects a person only from
being compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case."
The privilege, however, has been interpreted "to protect persons in
all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any sig-
nificant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."' 12 In
modem law, the privilege has been credited for protecting innocent
persons from unjustified convictions,' 3 for encouraging respect for
8 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
9 Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975
WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 344.
10 Id. at 333 n.214; MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 118, at 287 (3d
ed. 1984).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Historically, the privilege functioned to prevent the use of
physical force to extract confessions. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 286.
12 384 U.S. at 467.
13 MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 286-87. The authors note that an innocent suspect,
under the strain of accusation, may become confused and give an erroneous impression of
guilt. Id. at 287. The privilege against compelled self-incrimination gives the accused the
opportunity to forego all conversations with the police and thereby avoid this problem. Id.
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the judicial system by removing the temptation for perjury, 14 and
for encouraging witnesses to come forward by removing the possi-
bility that they will be compelled to incriminate themselves.' 5
Courts have held that in order to find a fifth amendment viola-
tion, the government must have compelled a suspect to make an
incriminating testimonial communication.' 6 But because every
confession is, by its nature, an incriminating communication, pro-
tecting the individual from compulsion becomes the focus of the
fifth amendment as a protective device in confession law.' 7
Like the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, due
process of law also focuses on compulsion. The due process clause,
however, differs from the fifth amendment because it focuses more
on police activity rather than the suspect's activity. Accordingly, in
the area of confession law, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
due process clause to require that a confession be excluded if the
methods used to extract the confession offend fundamental princi-
ples ofjustice.' 8 Thus, the due process clause manifests an under-
lying belief that "obtaining a self-incriminating statement from a
person in an impermissible way is a violation of his inherent
dignity."' 19
"Crime control" is the countervailing policy of confession
14 Id. at 286. It encourages respect because if a suspect were required to testify he
would have a significant incentive to perjure himself. Id. It also forces prosecutors to use
evidence which is more reliable than a confession. Id.
15 Id. at 287.
16 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
17 For a discussion of the question of what amounts to compulsion, see notes 73-118
infra and accompanying text. In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that mere compulsion is not sufficient to trigger a suspect's fifth amendment
rights. Rather, the compulsion must be "impermissible." Id. at 562.
18 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
528, 534 (1963). The Court has warned that the means used to extract confessions must
reflect the belief that our criminal justice system "is an accusatorial and not an inquisatorial
system." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
19 Dix, supra note 9, at 337. The use of such a statement against the accused is a viola-
tion of his fifth amendment rights. Id. See notes 9-17 supra and accompanying text.
In addition to this, a confession obtained through an impermissible tactic might be
unreliable. At common law, reliability was the only concern in determining admissibility.
Note, supra note 2, at 1172-73. Currently, however, reliability as an independent objective
of confession law does not exist. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961). It is still
an objective, however. Dix, supra note 9, at 329. The Supreme Court's present stance on
the issue of reliability is expressed in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of
involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confes-
sions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the
"strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed
where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings
a confession out of an accused against his will," and because of "the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; .
Id. at 385-86 (citations omitted).
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law.20 "'Fear of crime is destroying some of the basic human free-
doms which any society is supposed to safeguard-freedom of
movement, freedom from harm, freedom from fear itself.' "21 Pro-
ponents of the crime control argument believe that the dangers to
the public inherent in widespread criminal activity justify enhancing
police powers. 22 Scholars have argued that the magnitude of this
social and economic problem justifies a narrow interpretation of
the Bill of Rights.23 This argument implies that a narrow reading of
the Bill of Rights, giving the police more extensive powers, would
limit the crime problem and allay the safety concerns of society.24
Thus, the goals of confession law are clear. The possibility that
an innocent suspect may confess should be guarded against by pro-
tecting the suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination and
his right to due process of law. The countervailing goal of society's
interests in safety, freedom of movement, and freedom from fear
are manifested in a concern for crime control. The accommodation
of these two goals has led the courts to their present standard for
determining the admissibility of a confession: the totality of the cir-
cumstances test.
II. The Totality Standard and its Application
Under the current standard for voluntariness, a court must de-
termine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the de-
fendant's will has been overborne such that his confession is not of
his free choice. 25 In terms of coercion, the test focuses on two fac-
tors: (1) the defendant's ability to resist coercive interrogation tac-
tics, and (2) the specific police interrogation techniques. 26
In evaluating a defendant's ability to resist, courts generally fo-
cus on the personal characteristics of the individual. This subjec-
tive approach requires consideration of characteristics such as
20 Dix, supra note 9, at 344.
21 Levine, "The Great Executive Hand of CriminalJustice": The Crime Problem and the Activist
Judge, 7 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 907, 967 (1980) (quoting NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT: To ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC
TRANQUILrrY 16 (1970)).
22 D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINALJUSTICE 99 (1967).
23 Levine, supra note 21, at 963.
24 A related argument, arising out of Miranda, questions the propriety of using confes-
sion law to protect a suspect who has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel and his right to remain silent. See Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 108-09
(White, J., concurring). Proponents of this view suggest that excluding confessions made
after a voluntary waiver deprives "the fact-finding process of highly probative information
for no reason at all." Id. at I ll.
25 Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453 (1971) (citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)).
26 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 2, at 549 (1980). See also Steele, DeveLopments in the
Law of Interrogations and Confessions, I NAT'LJ. GRIM. DEF. 11, 130 (1970).
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age, 27 intelligence, 28 and physical illness29 to determine whether
the specific individual's will was overborne. Notably, courts have
also considered factors such as the defendant's race or ethnic back-
ground and his prior contact with the police.30
In addressing the police interrogation techniques, courts gen-
erally emphasize the possible presence of coercion in these meth-
ods. Psychological coercion is a common tactic often found in the
form of promises of leniency,3 l threats of additional punishment,3 2
and promises or threats regarding relatives or friends. 33 Other
forms of psychological coercion include requiring a polygraph test
during the interrogation,3s forcing the suspect to strip for the inter-
27 Lunnermon v. Peytin, 310 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Va. 1970); 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note
26, at 551-52; See also Lederer, The Law of Confessions-The Voluntariness Doctrine, 74 MIL. L.
REV. 67, 85 (1976).
28 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at 552. See also Lederer, supra note 27, at 86 (argu-
ing that mental retardation should only be one factor in the totality test for determining
voluntariness).
Several federal cases have relied on the defendant's mental illness or lack of education
in determining the voluntariness of a confession. See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404
(1967); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Rush v. Ziegle, 474 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. White, 451 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972);
Boulden v. Holman, 385 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1962), reh'g denied, 393 F.2d 932, reh'g denied,
395 F.2d 169 (1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 478 (1969). List compiled from An-
not., 4 A.L.R.4T 16, 25-30 (1981).
In some instances courts have ruled that the mental deficiencies of the defendant were
so great that the defendant was totally incapable of understanding the meaning of his con-
fession and therefore any resulting confession was involuntary. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin
455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972), United States v. Nash, 414 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
Both cases dealt with the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver.
29 Lederer, supra note 27, at 86. Professor Lederer argues that physical illness should
be a factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. Id. However, if the illness is
self-induced, as in intoxication, the general rule is that the defendant is considered to have
waived his right to make a voluntary and intelligent choice as to whether or not to confess.
Id. at 86-87. This does not mean that the police should be free to coerce if the defendant is
intoxicated. Proof of other factors is still permissible to show that the confession was invol-
untary when considering the totality of the circumstances.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986
(1978) (17 year old's confession held voluntary despite his low I.Q. because of numerous
prior contacts with police). See also 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at 553.
31 Lederer, supra note 27, at 81. A promise of leniency, in order to render a confession
involuntary, should be capable of being fulfilled. If it is not, the maker of the promise will
most likely have no influence. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 828, at 442 n. I (Chadbourn rev.
1970)
32 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at 554.
33 Id. at 555-59. The theory of rendering confessions involuntary due to such a threat
is based on the supposition that the relationship between the defendant and the threatened
relative is such that the threat will be a sufficient inducement for the confession. Id. at 556.
See also Annot. 80 A.L.R.2D 1428, 1431 n.14 (1961) for cases concerning this matter.
34 See Lederer, supra note 27, at 84. The polygraph tends to create apprehension in the
suspect thereby placing doubt on the true voluntariness of the suspect's statements. Id.
Several courts have looked at this differently and have held that coercion to take the poly-
graph test will render a confession involuntary but the mere presence of the polygraph
should not. Id. at 84-85.
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rogation,3 5 and deceit.3 6
The practicality of the totality standard has been criticized.
One such criticism is that the flexibility of the totality standard is
often used to avoid rigorous inquiry into the details surrounding
the confession.3 7 For example, in Johnson v. Hall,3 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on the defend-
ant's numerous previous contacts with the police in finding his con-
fession voluntary.3 9 The court of appeals believed that this sole
factor outweighed evidence suggesting that the defendant had a
limited education, that he had been denied sleep, that he was physi-
cally injured, and that he had been alone with several police officers
during "suggestive and incriminating" lineups. 40 Thus, without
supporting its rationale, the court focused on one factor to the ex-
clusion of others.
A second criticism of the totality test focuses on the problems
which arise in the use of such a subjective standard with no defined
guidelines.41 First, the test's application leads to inconsistent re-
sults because courts have not uniformly determined the weight to
be accorded each factor.42 Second, the subjectivity of the standard
administratively burdens the Supreme Court because lower courts
have been unable to apply the standard.4 3
III. The Bram Test
The practical shortcomings of the totality test suggest the need
for a new standard which would eliminate the subjectivity, lack of
uniformity, and administrative difficulties incurred under the ap-
35 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at 562-63.
36 Lederer, supra note 27, at 83-84.
37 Dix, supra note 9, at 303. One commentator has argued that the courts will only pay
slight attention to a defendant's characteristics, focusing mainly on the objective police in-
terrogation tactics when determining voluntariness. Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques
and the Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10 R-r.-CAM. L.J. 109, 137 (1978). Arguably,
courts will also avoid inquiry into police practices when a notable characteristic of the de-
fendant dominates the factual setting. See notes 38-40 infra and accompanying text.
38 605 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1979).
39 Id. at 581.
40 Id.
41 Dix, supra note 9, at 294. Professor Dix attributes this problem to the "totality of the
circumstances" test. As the lower courts had to begin applying the standard to police mis-
conduct which was not blatant (i.e., psychologically coercive as opposed to physically abu-
sive) the "line" of demarcation became difficult to decipher. Id.
The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and
methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult line to draw, particularily in
cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of
psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an
accused.
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
42 See Note, supra note 37, at 136.
43 See Dix, supra note 9, at 295. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1176.
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proach. 44 Moreover, the new standard should reflect the policy
considerations underlying confession law, favoring individual con-
stitutional rights when those rights clash with the interests of crime
control.
45
The basis of this standard is Bram v. United States, an 1897
case.46 In Bram the first mate of an American ship was charged with
the murder of several crew members. 47 After arrest, Bram made
incriminating statements to the authorities.48 The Court found
these statements involuntary, holding:
[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and vol-
44 Both the Supreme Court and Congress have attempted to achieve this goal. In Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court attempted to objectify the subjective stan-
dards of the totality test. The Court was concerned with both the complexity and the
coercive atmosphere of the interrogation process. See Note, supra note 37, at 116. Holding
that the fifth amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, the Miranda Court held that the fifth amendment requires the police to
apprise a suspect of both his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. 384 U.S. at
444.
Under the Miranda test, a court makes two inquiries. First, a court considers whether
counsel was present at the interrogation or whether the right to counsel was validly waived.
Dix, supra note 9, at 327. Second, a court considers the validity of any waiver of the right to
remain silent during the interrogation. Id. The court must find that both waivers were
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. 384 U.S. at 475. If the warnings were not
given or the waivers were invalid, any resulting confession is to be deemed involuntary and
therefore inadmissible. Id. at 444-45.
Congress has also sought to objectify confession law. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1982) re-
quires that the judge consider the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment, and
whether the defendant knew or was advised of his rights to remain silent and to the assist-
ance of cousel. This last criteria differs from Miranda because it considers the warning or
failure to warn of constitutional rights as only one factor which ajudge must consider when
determining voluntariness. Thus, its constitutionality is questionable as the holding in Mi-
randa is based on constitutional grounds.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982), a confession is presumed involuntary if it is ob-
tained more than six hours after the arrest of the defendant if he has not been brought
before a magistrate at that time. This is a rebuttable presumption and the court should
consider factors such as transportation and the nearest available magistrate.
These efforts have provided the defendant with an additional constitutional safeguard.
These efforts, however, do not actually address the criticisms of the totality approach. In
United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1978), the court held that issues of voluntari-
ness and compliance with Miranda are separate constitutional defenses and even though a
statement is obtained after Miranda warnings are given, it may still be inadmissible if invol-
untarily given. Id. at 647. One author argued that as a practical matter, the defendant's
due process voluntariness argument is of no significance because the old voluntariness test
has become the new standard for determining the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights.
Note, supra note 2, at 1181. If the Miranda rights have been validly waived the resulting
confession is presumed voluntary. Id. The author also argues that the voluntariness stan-
dard as applied to Miranda waivers has been relaxed making it easier for the police to obtain
the waiver. Id. Once the waiver is obtained, the police are relatively free to use any coer-
cive tactic to secure a confession.
45 See notes 10-19 supra and accompanying text.
46 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
47 Id. at 537.
48 Id. at 539.
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untary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, how-
ever slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence ....
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been
influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of
the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner,
and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been
exerted. 
4 9
Courts have traditionally applied only Brain's first statement regard-
ing threats and promises.50 This statement reflects the understand-
ing that threats and promises create pressure which unfairly impairs
the suspect's ability to make a rational choice.5 1 Logically, this ra-
tionale should extend beyond the realm of threats and promises
since other interrogation tactics also apply pressure which impairs a
suspect's ability to make a rational choice.
5 2
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court5 3 and the federal courts of
appeals5 4 have rejected a broad application of Bram. Rather, these
courts continue to apply the totality test. According to these
courts, to apply Bram with "wooden literalness"55 could come "at a
high cost to legitimate law enforcement activity, while adding little
desirable protection to the individual's interest in not being com-
49 Id. at 542-43 (emphasis added).
50 White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 620 (1979).
51 Id.
52 See notes 73-118 supra and accompanying text.
53 In Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the test for volun-
tariness is whether the confession resulted from any sort of threat or violence, any direct or
implied promise, or through the exertion of any improper influence. Id. at 130. The Court,
however, failed to restate the second portion of the Brain decision which holds that since
the law cannot measure the impact of the influence, any influence at all renders a confes-
sion involuntary.
54 A survey of the most recent decisions in the courts of appeals shows that four circuits
rely on the Bram test as interpreted by Hutto. The courts' analyses in these cases, however,
manifest a "totality" approach although the totality test is never mentioned. See United
States v. Gonzales, 736 F.2d 981, 982 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409,
411 (4th Cir. 1968) as controlling on the issue of the voluntariness standard in the Fourth
Circuit); United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 781 (2d Cir. 1983); Jones v. Cardwell, 686
F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.
1981) as controlling on the issue of the voluntariness standard in the Ninth Circuit); United
States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1979) (case reached court of appeals on a
procedural matter, but the court cited Bram as the controlling test for voluntariness in the
Seventh Circuit).
The remaining circuits apply the "totality of the circumstances" test. See Miller v. Fen-
ton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1465-66 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 9,
1985) (No. 84-5786); Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 772 (11th Cir. 1984); Rachlin v.
United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677,
686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Hall, 605 F.2d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 1979); United States
v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 993, 995 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Thorp, 498 F. Supp.
1202, 1203 (D. Colo. 1980).
55 United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1967).
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pelled to testify against himself."56
These courts fail to recognize that applying the literal language
of Bram would solve the problems of the totality test and, at the
same time, accommodate the goals of confession law. First, with
respect to the questions regarding the administration of the totality
test, the Bram standard would exclude a confession if any degree of
influence had been exerted.57 Accordingly, this standard avoids the
need for a detailed analysis of the facts 58 because a finding of any
improper influence will render the confession involuntary.5 9 Thus,
unlike the totality test, the Bram standard's single rule affords ease
of application, reduces arbitrariness and subjectivity, and provides
guidelines for courts to follow.
60
Second, and more importantly, the Bram standard reflects the
constitutional objectives of confession law.61 The premise underly-
ing Bram is that the law cannot adequately measure the effect of
coercion on a particular suspect and, accordingly, cannot determine
how much influence is harmful. Thus, under Bram, a court will ex-
clude a confession which results from any improper influence. 62
This result is mandated by a plain reading of the fifth amendment,
and, while the Bram standard is not required by the fourteenth
amendment, it does no violence to that amendment's meaning.
The fifth amendment-one of the two constitutional bases of
confession law-states, "no person . . . shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself in any criminal case." 63 The Supreme
Court's totality test, however, does not fully proscribe compulsion.
Rather, the test only prohibits a lesser degree of "impermissible"
compulsion.64 In effect, the totality test reduces fifth amendment
protections in favor of enhancing crime control.
The Supreme Court has reasoned that an "expansive" view of
the fifth amendment would do little to protect a person's right
against compelled self-incrimination and would severely hamper le-
gitimate law enforcement efforts. 65 This mitigation of the fifth
amendment's protection is unjustifiable, however. First, the effec-
tiveness of day-to-day police activity is not relevant to the fifth
56 Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244, 4248 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985).
57 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
58 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
59 Notes 73-118 infra and accompanying text deal with "improper influences" and their
effect on the voluntariness of a confession.
60 See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 10-19 supra and accompanying text.
62 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
64 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
65 Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244, 4248 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985).
[Vol. 60:800
amendment's constitutional protection.66 Courts should recognize
the constitutional rights granted to individuals and not impede
those rights.6 7 Second, it is not the proper function of the courts to
decide that crime control objectives outweigh constitutional
rights.6 8 Rather, such policy decisions should be made by the legis-
lature or by constitutional amendment.69 Finally, courts should not
act as super-legislatures. They should adhere to the plain test of
the Constitution and not stray to accommodate whatever transient
policies are currently in the public eye.70 Thus, an objective read-
ing of the fifth amendment-one not colored by the extra-constitu-
tional concerns of crime control-supports Bram's rule that any
improper influence in the interrogation process should render the
resulting confession involuntary.
Viewed in this light, due process-the second constitutional
underpinning of confession law-is overshadowed. The fourteenth
amendment requires only "fundamental fairness" in the govern-
ment's interrogation process. 7' Because courts balance fundamen-
tal fairness, the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment
will be far less than the protection afforded by a plain reading of the
fifth amendment. Because the totality of the circumstances test de-
veloped mainly through interpretations of the fourteenth amend-
ment,72 replacing that test with the Bram standard will restore the
previously eroded fifth amendment basis of confession law. Ac-
cordingly, the Bram test satisfies the full constitutional require-
ments of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments by invalidating
all confessions resulting from any improper influence in the inter-
rogation process.
IV. Interrogation Techniques and the Bram Test
The Bram test focuses on identifying "coercive" interrogation
tactics. Attempting to protect the defendant's rights, the Bram stan-
66 Levine, supra note 21, at 963.
67 Id.
68 See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
AlthoughJustice Rehnquist may not apply this rationale in this instance, he has recognized
that the advancement of socially acceptable goals through the judiciary offends the demo-
cratic process. Id. at 704. The only viable basis for fundamental moral judgments is the
"individual conscience." Id. A judge's conscience judgments are not better than the con-
science judgments of individuals. Id.
69 Id. at 699. "The Constitution . . . was designed to enable the popularly elected
branches of government. . . to keep abreast of the times." Id. The judiciary should not
take over where the legislature left off even if a pressing social problem exists. Id. at 699.
70 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 471ND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971). "If
we have constitutional rights and liberties already. . . the Court need make no fundamen-
tal value choices in order to protect them." Id. at 5.
71 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
72 See Note, supra note 37, at 114-18.
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dard requires the interrogator to maximize the suspect's ability to
make a fully informed choice concerning the confession. 73 This is
accomplished by allowing the suspect complete mental freedom
74
so that he will be aware that he has rights and may assert those
rights.
75
Accordingly, the interrogator must not give the suspect the im-
pression that his legal status will improve or deteriorate depending
upon whether he cooperates. 76 Further, if the interrogator makes
the defendant feel more guilty77 or less guilty, 78 he deprives the
suspect of complete mental freedom. This amounts to coercion
and should render a resulting confession involuntary.
Psychologically coercive interrogation techniques, the primary
method of impairing a suspect's mental freedom, fall into two cate-
gories: rational appeals and emotional appeals. 79 Rational appeals
are those which prey on the victim's sense of logic, manipulating his
reasoning process in an effort to coerce a confession. Emotional
73 See Dix, supra note 9, at 343. "Full implementation would direct the condemnation
of confessions made in ignorance of, or under a misapprehension concerning, any matter of
fact or law relating to the decision to confess." Id. Professor Dix also argues that this
objective has "permeated" the case law in that constitutional "voluntariness" cases often
regard the defendant's awareness of his legal and factual status as important. Id. at 331.
74 Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 881
(1979). Professor Grano retreats from a strict mental freedom approach. He proposes that
the test for voluntariness should be whether the degree of impairment of the suspect's
mental freedom should excuse him from being held accountable for his confession. Id. at
883-84.
75 Dix, supra note 9, at 331.
76 White, supra note 50, at 621. Professor White makes this statement in the context of
threats and promises. By analogy, this rule is applicable to other coercive interrogation
techniques. See notes 83-118 infra and accompanying text.
77 Horowitz, The Psychology of Confession, 47J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 197,
203 (1956). In his article, Professor Horowitz talks of limiting the subject's "space of free
movement" as a prerequisite to obtaining a confession. Id. at 199. He outlines five steps
interrogators should take to limit the suspect's psychological "space of free movement."
First, the interrogator should make the suspect believe that he has been accused. Id. This
factor combined with the second step, the suspect's perception of authority held by the
interrogator, does two things: it limits the suspect's space of free psychological movement
and places the suspect on the defensive psychologically. Id. Once the defendant is placed
on the defensive with his psychological freedom limited, the interrogator should attempt to
further limit this freedom. The interrogator can accomplish this through the third and
fourth steps: presenting the suspect with evidence of his guilt (factual or fictional) and
reducing the accused's friendly forces. Id. at 201-03. This creates the final element of
Horowitz's argument, guilt. Id. at 203. The accused should believe he has caused a nega-
tive act. Id. The only alternative left to the suspect is confession. Id. As the accused's
space of freedom becomes smaller and smaller it becomes easier for his mind to continue in
this direction than it is to turn back. Id. at 204. At this point, his mind should accept
confession without resistance. Id.
78 Other authors suggest that rather than attempting to increase the guilt feelings of
the suspect, the interrogator should attempt to reduce guilt feelings. This can be accom-
plished by reducing the moral seriousness of the crime. Sterling, Police Interrogations and the
Psychology of Confession, 14J. PuB. L. 25, 39 (1965).
79 Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42, 50 (1968).
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appeals look toward the suspect's character. They affect his pride,
guilt, and fears.
There are three types of rational appeals. The first type,
threats or promises, is designed to "apply a degree of pressure to
an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational
choice." 80 Threats or promises may be express or implied.8 1
Under the totality test, the existence of threats and promises
does not necessarily mandate exclusion of a resulting confession.82
On the other hand, threats and promises offend the Bram standard
because they deny the suspect complete mental freedom. The
threat or promise leads the suspect to believe that his legal position
(or that of a friend or relative) will somehow be affected by his co-
operation. This denies the suspect the opportunity to make a fully
informed and rational decision.
Deception, the second type of rational appeal, has several man-
ifestations.83 An interrogator may attempt to coax a confession by
presenting the suspect with fabricated physical evidence tending to
prove his guilt.84 Or, the interrogator may use the accomplice con-
fession ploy. 5 Under this technique, the interrogator plays one
suspect against another.86 The interrogator tries to bluff a confes-
80 White, supra note 50, at 620. There are two separate types of threats which will put
psychological pressure on a suspect. The distinction is based upon whether the threats
relate directly to the susp&ct's legal status. Id. at 617-23. Threats relating to the defend-
ant's legal status include threats of continued detention, excessive bond, maximum
sentences, and reporting a noncooperative attitude to the prosecuting attorney. Lederer,
supra note 27, at 80. Threats which do not relate to the defendant's legal status generally
include threats to arrest or prosecute friends or relatives. 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at
555-56. The problem with threats and promises is twofold. The first problem is the threat
or promise itself. The second problem is that the suspect might infer a reciprocal promise
on the part of the interrogator not to carry out the threat if the defendant cooperates. See
White, supra note 50, at 619 (discussion of the interrogation of John Biron). Thus, the
threat to push for the maximum sentence might amount to an implied promise of leniency
in return for cooperation.
81 Id. at 618-19. Professor White gives the example of the accused being placed in a
lineup where he is identified by fictitious witnesses who implicate him in other crimes. Id. at
618. The implied threat is that if the accused does not confess to the crime charged, he will
be prosecuted for crimes he did not commit. Id. at 619.
82 Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456 (3d Cir. 1984) (repeated promises to get the defend-
ant psychiatric help if he confessed were not sufficient to render the confession involun-
tary), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1985) (No. 84-5786).
83 Lederer, supra note 27, at 83-84.
84 Note, supra note 2, at 1195. See also Note, supra note 37, at 130. Essentially, the
interrogator attempts to convince the suspect that the evidence against him is overwhelm-
ing and that he should make it easy on himself by confessing. Id. at 130. According to
Professors Inbau and Reid, ihis technique will cause a guilty person to attempt to explain
the evidence while an innocent suspect will merely reassert his innocence. F. INBAU & J.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 104 (2d ed. 1967).
85 Note, supra note 2, at 1194; United States ex rel. Hall v. Director, Dep't of Correc-
tions, 578 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978).
86 See F. INBAU &J. REID, supra note 84, at 84-91. This ploy is usually used as a last
resort. If the bluff fails and the suspect knows his accomplice has not confessed, the inter-
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sion out of the first suspect by intimating that the suspect's cohort
has already confessed and implicated the accused in his state-
ment.8 7 Finally, the interrogator may either present the suspect
with a fictitious eyewitness to the crime88 or have a fake eyewitness
identify the suspect in a lineup.8 9 In each situation, the tactic is
designed to show the accused that the evidence against him is suffi-
cient to convict him and that a confession is advisable. 90
The totality test permits deception in certain instances. 91
Under the Bram standard, however, these tactics may never be
used.92 If the police have overwhelming evidence against the ac-
cused, they need not interrogate him to obtain a confession.
93
Conversely, if the evidence is not overwhelming, the interrogator's
fabrication of evidence amounts to psychological coercion.94 De-
ceptive practices distort the suspect's view of reality thereby deny-
ing him his right to complete mental freedom. 95
The third type of rational appeal involves a misrepresentation
of the charge against the suspect. 96 In a murder case-the most
common scenario for this appeal-the interrogator tells the suspect
that the victim is still alive, leading the suspect to believe that his
crime is only assault.97 On the other hand, the interrogator may
misrepresent the charge by having fictitous eyewitnesses associate
rogator will no longer have the psychological edge. Id. at 90. At this juncture, the interro-
gation becomes pointless. Id.
87 Id. at 84-85.
88 Note, supra note 2, at 1196. Once again there is the danger that the suspect will
realize that the interrogator is bluffing and the problem that a confession is really not nec-
essary if the interrogator "can piece together the real story." Id.
89 Id. at 1197. For a criticism of this tactic, see note 88 supra.
90 See Note, supra note 37, at 130.
91 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding a confession volun-
tary when police told the defendant that he had already been connected with the incident;
in fact they had no such information), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1985)
(No. 84-5786); United States ex rel. Hall v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 578 F.2d 194 (7th
Cir. 1978) (holding a confession voluntary when an interrogator misled the defendant into
believing his cohorts had confessed).
92 See Note, supra note 2, at 1196-97.
93 Id.
94 The deception fogs the suspect's perception of his factual and legal situation. It
thereby affects his ability to make a fully informed and rational choice as to whether to
confess. See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
95 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
96 White, supra note 50, at 611. See also Note, supra note 37, at 125-26. The constitu-
tionality of such a tactic has been questioned. In order for a defendant to confess he must
intelligently waive his right to remain silent. An intelligent waiver of this right requires that
the defendant be apprised of the "crucial" facts in the case. If the charge against him has
been misrepresented, he cannot be aware of all the "crucial" facts and therefore cannot
intelligently waive his right to remain silent. Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 435,
322 A.2d 119, 126 (1974) (cited in Note, supra note 37, at 125 n.87).
97 Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1468 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1985) (No. 84-5786).
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the suspect with additional offenses. 98 The interrogator hopes to
convey the message that the suspect's failure to cooperate will be
met with prosecution for crimes he may not have committed. 99
Although the totality test has permitted misrepresentation, 00
both methods would be psychologically coercive under Brain. The
inherent deceit in either scenario clouds the suspect's understand-
ing of the facts and consequences involved m1' and thereby distorts
his capacity to make a fully informed and well reasoned decision.10 2
Three types of common interrogation techniques can be con-
sidered emotional appeals.' 03 In the first technique, appropriately
entitled "feigned empathy,"' 0 4 the interrogator either shows sym-
pathy for the suspect, flatters him, or acts friendly toward him.1 05
The interrogator, acting as a friend, then condemns the victim or
the suspect's accomplice in an effort to shift the blame from the
suspect and make it easier for him to confess.' 0 6 This technique
often leads the suspect to believe that his comments will be confi-
dential, thus distorting the suspect's perception of his right to re-
main silent.' 0 7 Therefore, because the suspect does not clearly
understand his legal rights, he is unable to rationally choose
whether to confess.' 08
In the second type of emotional appeal, the "Mutt and Jeff"
routine, 0 9 one interrogator, "Jeff," acts friendly toward the subject
and tries to put him at ease. 10 The second interrogator, "Mutt,"
98 White, supra note 50, at 618.
99 Id. at 619. The New Haven study shows that this method is commonly used. Note,
Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1546 (1967).
Arguably, this latter form of misrepresentation amounts to an implied threat. See
White, supra note 50, at 619. "In effect, the police say to the suspect, 'Confess to the crime
you are charged with, or you will find yourself being prosecuted for crimes that you did not
commit.'" Id. This might lead the suspect to believe his legal position will be worse if he
does not confess, thus offending the objectives of the Bram test. See note 76 supra and
accompanying text.
100 Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1468 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons,J., dissenting) (police
officers assertion that victim was still alive was insufficient to render the resulting confes-
sion involuntary), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1985) (No. 84-5786).
101 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
102 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
103 Driver, supra note 79, at 50.
104 Note, supra note 37, at 121.
105 Driver, supra note 79, at 50.
106 Id. Professor Driver notes two of the more interesting interrogation sequences. In
the first scenario, the detective compliments the inexperienced burglar on the "profes-
sional" quality of his crime. In the second, the interrogator attempts to lay the blame on
the victim of a rape by statihg, "Say, she's pretty nice. I probably would have done the
same thing myself.... She probably let you have it your way, and now she's mad at you."
Id. at 50 n.45 (citing Note, supra note 99, at 1544-45).
107 Note, supra note 37, at 125.
108 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
109 White, supra note 50, at 625. See also Driver, supra note 79, at 51.
110 White, supra note 50, at 625.
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then berates the suspect and acts in a hostile manner."1 ' This
makes it easier for Jeff to obtain the confession.' 12 The danger is
that a nervous and confused suspect might interpret Mutt's over-
tures as threats of physical mistreatment-especially when Jeff is
not in the room.
1 3
Finally, the interrogator may appeal to the suspect's emotions
by reducing the moral seriousness of the charge.'14 This generally
reduces the suspect's guilt feelings and eases the confession.1 15
This is coercive, however, because the suspect is not acting with a
true awareness of his situtation. 1 6 Again, the danger is that as the
interrogator distorts the suspect's perception of reality, he reduces
the suspect's mental freedom.' 7 Under Bram, this offends the sus-
pect's constitutional rights and should therefore render any result-
ing confession inadmissible.
All of these interrogation ploys, although effective methods for
obtaining confessions, violate the Bram standard's heightened re-
spect for the suspect's constitutional right against compelled self-
incrimination and his right to due process of law. Accordingly, an
interrogator, perhaps unknowingly, may coerce an involuntary con-
fession from a suspect through the use of these ploys. 1 8 Because
the goal of confession law is to prevent this, these tactics should be
Ill Id.
112 According to Professors Inbau and Reid, it is Mutt's "beration" of the suspect that
makes Jeffs sympathy more effective. F. INBAU &J. REID, supra note 84, at 63. The suspect
will want to avoid any further confrontations with Mutt so he confesses tojeff. White, supra
note 50, at 626-27. The Miranda opinion labeled a variation of the "Mutt and Jeff" routine
an interrogation "ploy." 384 U.S. at 452. It then condemned the use of "patent psycholog-
ical ploys," id. at 457, thus, implying that the "Mutt and Jeff" routine was inherently coer-
cive. White, supra note 50, at 626.
113 White, supra note 50, at 627. There is also the possibility thatJeffls friendly attitude
will lead the suspect to believe that his words will not be used against him, thus distorting
his perception of his true legal position. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
114 See Sterling, supra note 78, at 39. See also F. INBAU &J. REID, supra note 84, at 37-39.
115 F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 84, at 37-38. For example, the authors suggest that,
when interrogating a thief, the interrogator should mention that most people will steal if
given the opportunity. Id. at 37. The interrogator should also back this statement up by
citing empirical studies which tend to show this. Id.
116 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
117 See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
118 Our criminal justice system is based upon the principle that it is better to let ten
guilty persons go free than it is to convict one innocent person. Professor Horowitz argues
that guilt feelings in the suspect will lead to confession. Horowitz, supra note 77, at 203.
He also states that innocent persons may harbor guilt feelings when they are "placed under
a cloud of accusation." Id. Thus, an interrogation tactic which makes an innocent suspect
feel guilty could coerce a confession.
A more likely scenario involves the use of a promise of leniency. See notes 80-82 supra
and accompanying text. The promise places pressure on a suspect's ability to make a ra-
tional choice. White, supra note 50, at 620. This, coupled with the inherently coercive
atmosphere of the interrogation process could "diminish significantly the suspect's ability
to evaluate" the worth of the promise. Id. at 621. This could lead an innocent person to
confess. Id.
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proscribed within the framework of confession law as suggested by
the Brain standard.
V. Conclusion
Modem confession law generally applies only in instances
where the suspect has validly waived his right to an attorney and his
right to remain silent. In these instances, confession law attempts
to prevent the possibility that an innocent suspect will confess, yet
not overburden the crime control function of the police. The total-
ity of the circumstances test combines these goals in an effort to
formulate a workable standard. The totality test, however, is not
the best solution because it offends the public policy underlying the
criminal justice system and is a difficult standard for courts to apply.
The Brain test, on the other hand, provides for more efficient appli-
cation. Also, because Bram's goal is to exclude the possibility that
an innocent suspect will confess to a crime, it is not offensive to the
public policy underlying our criminal justice system. To adopt the
Brain standard, the courts must lower the threshold requirements of
the fifth amendment by realizing that crime control alone is not a
sufficient mitigating factor.
Once the Brain standard is adopted, interrogators will be re-
quired to allow a suspect complete mental freedom and therefore
ensure his ability to make a fully informed and rational decision
regarding a confession. To guarantee this mental freedom certain
interrogation techniques, while presently permissible under the to-
tality approach, would be impermissible under Brain. Eliminating
these interrogation techniques is consistent with the Brain stan-
dard's ultimate goal of removing even the remote possibility that an
innocent suspect will confess.
Gregory K Thoreson
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